Hence it comes about, as it is said in Metaphysics II [Ia, 1], that “our intellect is related to the most knowable things in reality as the eye of an owl is related to the sun.”’. [2] This can take place in two ways. [2] There must be some composition in every being that is not its essence or quiddity. For a thing and the definition of a name are posited in the same way. The first point is that our intellect is absolutely finite whereas the divine intellect is infinite. For the divine intellect is in its capacity equal to its substance, and therefore it understands fully what it is, including all its intelligible attributes. For joy and desire are only of a good that is loved, and fear and sadness are only of an evil that is opposed to the good that is loved; and from these all the other affections take their origin. But in the order of the universe certain things exist to ward off dangers that may come about from certain other things. If the second alternative be the case, either such being must depend on the essence, or both must depend on another cause, or the essence must depend on the being. Therefore, there is justice in God, to which it belongs to give to each one what belongs to him. [6] Everything, likewise, that is predicated univocally of many things belongs through participation to each of the things of which it is predicated; for the species is said to participate in the genus and the individual in the species. For a substance is a being through itself. English. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Now, names have been devised to signify the natures or essences of things. [3] Furthermore, since the understood good is the object of the will, the will can will anything conceived by the intellect in which the nature of the good is present. [8] Now, from what has been said it is evident that the argument advanced on the opposite side is not opposed to the truth we have shown. The divine intellect must, therefore, be an absolutely unmoved mover. On the other hand, God is not called a stone, even though He has made stones, because in the name stone there is understood a determinate mode of being according to which a stone is distinguished from God. It remains, then, that God wills Himself and other things together and in the same act of will. Something is said to be a being through itself because it is not in another. [1] From what was shown above it follows that God wills His own being and His own goodness in a necessary way, and cannot will the contrary. The first desired, therefore, God, is truly good. That is why Aristotle goes on to say that the condition of the first mover may be twofold [VIII, 5]. Plato [ Timaeus ] seems to speak for this solution when he introduces God addressing the heavenly bodies as follows: “By your natures you are dissoluble, but through my will you are indissoluble; for my will is greater than your bond.” Hence, because He wills Himself to be, He likewise wills other things, which are ordered to Him as to the end. 3:6);...“with whom there is no change” (James 2:17). God is, therefore, one. Hence, just as the latter principles fall within the definition of universal man, so the former principles would fall in the definition of Socrates if he could be defined. The divine truth, therefore, is the first, highest, and most perfect truth. That is why all colors are measured by white. Now, what is known only in a general way is not perfectly known, since one does not yet know what is most important in that thing, namely, the ultimate perfections, by which its proper being is completed; so that by such a knowledge a thing is known potentially rather than actually. But this is not absolutely necessary or, as some say, with the necessity of the consequent; it is necessary conditionally, or with the necessity of the consequence. [15] Again, whatever other passions are species of these or are caused by them, are for the same reason removed from God. The divine substance, therefore, has no accidents whatever. Thus, He is not through Himself a necessary being. • Affordable price. For something is said to be more or less white according to the mode in which its whiteness is completed. [1] From this result it follows that God wills Himself and other things by one act of will. That is why it was necessary for the human mind to be called to something higher than the human reason here and now can reach, so that it would thus learn to desire something and with zeal tend towards something that surpasses the whole state of the present life. Now, the first moving substance is God. For the Apostle says: “The spirit searches all things, yea, the deep things of God” (1 Cor. Since, then, that which is found in God perfectly is found in other things according to a certain diminished participation, the basis on which the likeness is observed belongs to God absolutely, but not to the creature. There is therefore, in it the greatest unity, and hence no plurality is in any way distinguished within it. [5] Moreover,.the communication of being and goodness arises from goodness. Nor is it permissible to believe as false that which we hold by faith, since this is confirmed in a way that is so clearly divine. It does not follow first because it is not known to all, even including those who admit that God exists, that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. Thus, as we add to the power of the mover, we shall always add to the time according to the same proportion. But in God there are intellect and will, lacking no perfection. Let us consider a determined point on the circumference of a circle. Thus, this verse of the Psalms (85:8): “There is none among the gods like You, O Lord”; and elsewhere: “I have said: You are gods” (Ps. But, as we have shown, God is being in act without potency. But all things in His goodness are one, since other things are in Him according to His way, namely, “the material immaterially and the many unitedly,” as appears from what has been said. [7] Moreover, God’s willing is His being, as has been proved. [8] Sacred Teaching as well casts aside this error in confessing that God is “high and elevated,” according to Isaiah (6:1), and that He is “over all,” according to Romans (9:5). Nor, again, is God Himself, Who is the highest intelligible, understood by anyone as perfectly as He is perfect, since the being of no thing is as perfect as the divine being, nor can the operation of any being be more perfect than its substance. Now, that knowledge is certain which cannot be deceived. Therefore, we can find something nobler above all bodies. [6] The remark of Aristotle likewise agrees with this conclusion. Hence, by the fact that some things about God are proposed to man that surpass his reason, there is strengthened in man the view that God is something above what he can think. But there cannot be a mode of perfection, nor is one thinkable, by which a given perfection is possessed more fully than it is possessed by the being that is perfect through its essence and whose being is its goodness. Hence, it can know infinite things only successively by numbering them. [18] To this objection some reply that, as far as its own power is concerned, a heavenly body can fail, but it acquires an eternal duration from another being of an infinite power.