Laws give them guidelines to follow that will help them evade potential punitive consequences. It is inflicted only on those who are guilty of violating the law. The researcher assumed that primary and secondary rules are totally different which proved to be absolutely right and the researcher also assumed that the theory of Hart was accepted by the other jurists, but many jurists have criticized it and given totally different opinions which can be read in the conclusion.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Avtar Singh & Harpreet Kaur, Introduction to Jurisprudence, (Nagpur: Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa), 3rd Edition, p1[2] Ibid. Hart does address these questions when other scholars start questioning legal positivism. There is a long tradition of mixed theories of punishment in the seventeenth century. 1. For Further Details Contact: "� These confer (legal) rights in duties and Hart does not try at all to eliminate such evaluative talk. & PUB. The bulk of the article is taken up with a discussion of justifications, excuses, and mitigating factors. That a secondary rule is accepted is an external, descriptive fact. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY chs. However, it leaves us with a vestige of the problem we noticed in both Austin to Kelsen. "� Hart's explicit motive is explanatory rather than logical. [13]Conclusion & Criticism Made On The Rule TheoryThe view of Lord Lloyd is that Hart’s description of a developed legal system in terms of a union of primary and secondary rules is undoubtedly of value as a tool of analysis of much that has puzzled both the jurists and the political theorists. Inside the system, we view the secondary rules as norms. [3] Availbale at, visited on January 13, 2011[4] V.D.Mahajan, Jurisprudence & Legal Theory, (Nagpur: Eastern Book Company), 5th Edition,p528[5] G.P.Tripathi, Indian Jurisprudence, (Haryana: Allhabad Law Agency),1st Edition, p158[6] Supra note 1 at p.100[7] Supra note 4 at p.157[8] Supra note 1 at p.100[9] Supra note 5 at p.158[10] Available at, visited on January 14,2011[11] Supra note 5 at p.158[12] Available at, visited on January 16,2011[13] Supra note 5 at p.160[14] Supra note 4 at p.540, The  author can be reached at: [email protected], Submit your Article by using our online form Hart’s account of Austin’s view. He adds a clever way of understanding the two conditions listed above. Hart feels as though this is an inadequate theory of law. 1-17 (1977); H.L.A. He opined that a theory of law must be ‘pure’, that is, it must be free from the influence o… Hart's main development beyond Kelsen is to transform Kelsen's basic norm into a more complex analysis of law that distinguishes two kinds of "rules. Lord Lloyd asks the question whether it is possible to reduce to reduce all the rules of the legal system to rules which impose duties and to rules which confer powers. Professor Hart himself seems to recognize that his legal system is not necessarily as comprehensive as he appears to indicate since he suggests that there are other elements in a legal system, and in particular the “open texture” of legal rules as well as the relationship of law to morality and justice. There is a long tradition of mixed theories of punishment in the seventeenth century. It is doubtful whether all the so-called secondary rules can properly be treated as a unified class. This is an over-simplification of a point. Killing is usually wrong but, in this kind of case, it is not.). In the case at hand, if the general justifying aim of punishment is that those who are guilty of moral wrongs should suffer, then the state should not punish anyone who violates these laws. Hart, H. L. A. AFF. That shows that the retributivist’s answer to the question about the distribution of punishment is independent of the retributivist’s answer to the question about the general aim of punishment. They are relevant to the distribution of punishment: we excuse those who are mentally incompetent or who act in ignorance, even though what they did was wrong. In his opinion, the utilitarians have the correct way of answers a question about what he calls the justifying aim of punishment while the retributivists have the right answer to what he calls questions about the distribution of punishment. Some theorists have developed what Hart called the “predictive theory of law,” which claims that law is a way for human beings to predict the actions of the fellow beings, particularly which of their own actions will bring upon themselves a hostile reaction from their peers. That is a problem because punishing the innocent could have desirable consequences and so would be justified, according to the utilitarian’s proposed sufficient condition. Legal commands, along with enabling legislation, repealing, declaring etc., all create change or remove rights and duties.� They do this whether or not they are backed by punishment. Imagine an alien race studying the human species as a naturalist wo… "� (This was particularly so since natural rights phrases were included in the Bill of Rights as well as the Declaration of Independence.) The difference between the general justifying aim of punishment and the distribution of punishment. He worked in the style of British "ordinary language analysis" and examined and clarified a host of other legal concepts-many of which we will address in the latter portions of the course. He claimed that it would only be fair for society to enforce its laws if people have the opportunity to avoid punishment; this is possible only if punishment is limited to voluntary actions by the mentally competent. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 147-53 (1982). Kelsen's basic norm is mainly a procedural one.� Any content requirement, he says, begins to look too much like it blurs the boundary between moral and legal systems of prescription.�, H. L. A. Hart is a "giant" of Anglo-English legal theory.� He follows Kelsen quite naturally though I do not remember Hart giving Kelsen much notice or credit. than Hart's theory can. As we saw, an early goal of Austin's positive theories was to replace prescriptive with descriptive terms in a theory of law.� This was supposed to be a "definition" of law that was distinct from the evaluation of law.� The command theory was a spectacular failure and most modern positive theories have followed Kelsen in positing instead an independent (of morality) realm of legal prescription.